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NATIONAL PRIDE IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD:

SURVEY DATA FROM 24 NATIONS

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ABSTRACT

What brings credit and prestige to a nation in the eyes of its citizens? Taking a multi-dimensional approach, we investigate national pride in the country's science, economy, arts and literature, and sport. Data from the International Social Survey Programme's 24 nation 'National Identity' module ($N=30,894$) show that people throughout the developed world feel national pride in all these things, contrary to most globalization hypotheses. Pride in the economy shows the most variation among nations, and pride in science also varies greatly, while pride in the arts and literature and in sport vary less. Regression analyses show that linkages of pride to national attachment also vary cross-culturally: pride in science is more consequential in English-speaking countries but pride in arts less consequential; pride in sports matters is seen especially in smaller nations; and pride in economic achievements matters everywhere.

National pride involves both admiration and stake holding—the feeling that one has some kind of share in an achievement or an admirable quality. Scholarly interest in national pride stems in part from concern that shame, or even lack of pride, may provide support for destructive, internationally aggressive political parties (Scheff and Retzinger 1991) and may impede constructive engagement in foreign policy (Deng 1997). By contrast, others argue that *too much* national pride could encourage bellicosity and xenophobia (e.g. Allardt 2000, Phillips 1996).¹ Although national feelings are usually associated with the rise of the nation state, some argue that they arose earlier (e.g. Gorski 2000) and hence may also outlast nation states, perhaps with the more aggressive national feelings moderated by a variety of non-competing loyalties (Etzioni 2001). Questions about how much national pride people have, and how that varies among nations, derive new urgency from the issue of globalization.

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¹ A more extreme version holds that national feeling is inherently opposed to universalized values such as human rights (e.g. Canovan 2000).

THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL PRIDE

GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL PRIDE

There are two conflicting points of view about how globalization—sometimes seen as largely an economic movement, sometimes as a largely political and legal shift, sometimes as both—is shaping national feelings.

- 1 A variety of hypotheses hold that globalization is weakening national feelings. In the *globalizing-institutions*' hypothesis, the internationalization of culture and the logic of modern institutions tends strongly towards the evolution of transnational linkages, with authority legitimated by expertise rather than democracy (Meyer *et al.* 1997). The *economic globalization* hypothesis holds that increasing economic complexity and international integration of markets may be making the nation-state obsolete (Cerny 1995). The *irrelevant state* hypothesis holds that the expanded scope of the market within countries—as well as among them—means that the state has less to offer, thereby undermining incentives towards attachment and pride (Schwartzman 1998, Tambini 2001). Finally, according to the *dispersed loyalties* hypothesis, national attachment is weakening both in the face of strengthened local identities and emerging supra-national identities, but possibly only on some dimensions (Dijkstra *et al.* 2001, Franck 1996).
- 2 By contrast, alternative hypotheses and a great deal of evidence suggest that national attachment is not weakening. Institutional differentiation among nation-states persists; national boundaries continue to function as key demarcations for economic redistribution (Birnbaum and Strong 1996, Koopmans and Statham 1999) and democratic national (rather than supra-national) institutions are developing in many post-Communist countries (Duch and Palmer 2002, Treisman and Gimpelson 2001). The *big-tools* hypothesis argues that although supra-national entities such as the European Union and the United Nations offer economic conveniences and dispute-resolution mechanisms, their undemocratic processes, remoteness, and lack of compelling ideology prevent them from creating strong loyalties (Stein 2001). Their support is instrumental, while opposition reflects both ideological and national affective elements (Gabel 1998), although some argue that instrumental adaptation usually precedes affective shifts (e.g. Schooler 1996). In fact, there is no sign that national identity is weakening in Europe in favour of a unified European identity (Deflem and Pampel 1996, Dombrowski and Rice 2000). The survey evidence on whether sub-national loyalties conflict with national feelings is mixed (e.g. Bobo 1997, Dowley and Silver 2000, McIntosh *et al.* 1995).²

² Nearly all the high quality survey data that has been presented on these issues pertains to the developed world, so it would be premature to generalize these results to Africa or Latin America or most of Asia.

The fact that national feelings do not appear to be on the decline, and that there seems to be substantial variation among nations in the intensity of the feelings, make examining these matters in more detail a matter of some urgency.

DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL PRIDE

Several of these diverse hypotheses agree in suggesting that national feelings may be multidimensional (Guillén 2001, Kelley and Evans 1998a, Meyer *et al.* 1997), a possibility that gains additional plausibility from the demonstrated multidimensionality of national identity (Evans 1996c, Hjerm 1998, Jones and Smith 2001).³ For example pride in the nation's armed forces might be uncorrelated with pride in the arts and literature, or with pride in fair treatment of diverse social groups. Alternatively, the view of the *civilizing process* as being the dominant trend (Elias 2000) would suggest that there might be an evolutionary transition from pride in the military and in history to pride in the economy and, subsequently, to pride in the arts and sciences.

Accordingly, it makes sense to examine many aspects of national pride in a diverse group of nations, and to assess whether levels of these different aspects of pride differ among cultural and linguistic groups (as the *persistent-differences* hypothesis would suggest) or whether they vary along a development dimension (as the *civilizing-process* hypothesis suggests). Moreover, on the argument that people have both feelings of belonging to a country (closeness) and feelings of pride or its absence (Bollen and Medrano 1998), it makes sense to investigate how strong are the links between different aspects of pride and feelings of closeness to one's country.

What aspects of national pride should be considered? At these early stages of discovery, a rather eclectic collection would seem best, beginning with concepts that work cross-nationally.⁴

1 *Pride in science*

Nations have been trying to inculcate positive feelings by co-opting individual achievements in science, adventure, and sport for at least two centuries. Consider, for example, governmental sponsorship of aviation contests and polar exploration at the beginning of the twentieth century (Palmer 1995) or the space race at mid-century. The *civilizing-process* hypothesis suggests that national pride in science will increase with economic development. Similarly, the *postmaterialist-values* hypothesis would suggest that pride in science will be stronger in countries

³ The multidimensionality issue had previously been raised by historians concerning socio-political integration of immigrants (Inglis 1991, Price 1991), before being validated in the survey data.

⁴ Thus, the exploration excludes concepts that are important in just one country, such as national pride in cuisine in France (Ferguson 1998).

that have satisfied basic material needs.⁵ Alternatively, science may be an especially attractive vehicle for national feeling in multi-ethnic countries because it does not privilege any particular cultural group (Kelley 1996) and is associated with ethnic tolerance (Evans 1996*d*).

By contrast, the *globalizing-institutions* hypothesis suggests that science and technology are by nature universal, and hence have a strong tendency to become linked to cross-national networks and supra-national organizations (Meyer *et al.* 1997). This suggests that people will not derive much national pride from the achievements of their local scientists, so national pride associated with science will generally be low. Moreover, economic development should increasingly sap national pride in science, as richer countries' science is sucked into a supra-national culture.

2 *Pride in the economy*

Because economic success varies greatly, so too should national pride in the economy.⁶ In the formerly Communist nations, discovery of their relative poverty was recent and shocking, so we expect them to take little pride in their economies (Miller *et al.* 1996). The civilizing-process hypothesis suggests that pride in the economy should be one of the things replacing pride in the military, so there should be a positive association between pride in the economy and economic development.⁷

By contrast, a postmaterialist approach (Inglehart 1989, 1997) suggests that national pride in the economy decreases with economic success. In this view, people first satisfy their most basic needs and then take that gratification for granted while they set their sights on new aesthetic, social, and knowledge-oriented goals (Maslow 1954). As the economy prospers, people will come to take it for granted and cease to take pride in it.

3 *Pride in sport*

Much sport is organized internationally; international sport attracts vast audiences; and competitive games between localities date back into antiquity. Moreover, the glorification of the human body and the very brief durations of most modern sporting events are in tune with today's post-Victorian attitudes and short attention spans (Giddens 1990). Hence, to the extent that national

⁵ From a world-wide perspective, all the countries available in the survey data we use have satisfied basic material needs except the Philippines and perhaps Russia where some live in genuine, life-threatening poverty.

⁶ The hypothesis that pride in the economy stimulates national feeling and cohesion underlies the use of economic sanctions in international relations, and derives some support from analyses of country-level data showing that financial sanctions do tend to lead target regimes to alter their behaviour (Dashti-Gibson *et al.* 1997).

⁷ Moreover, the civilizing process hypothesis implies a negative association between pride in the military and pride in the economy.

feelings need to build on mechanical solidarity, sports would seem to offer good materials (Gellner 1983). As a result, we expect pride in sport to be relatively high in all nations. Prior research and theory also suggests some international differentiation, specifically that small nations are especially proud of their sport (Evans 1996*b*), arguably because the organization of international sport through the Commonwealth Games, the Olympics, and similar fora ensures that they are represented as equal with large countries and thereby receive international recognition that they could not otherwise achieve (Malcolm 2001). Alternatively, sporting successes might be especially important to the sense of nationhood in new countries that lack a rich heritage of common memories (Renan 1990), implying a negative association of pride in history and pride in sport. If the civilizing-process hypothesis is correct, then pride in sport should be one of the things replacing pride in the military, so there should be a growth of pride in sport with socioeconomic development, and a negative association between pride in the military and pride in sport.

4 Pride in arts and literature

According to the civilizing-process hypothesis, the arts and literature should be gaining prominence as vehicles of national feeling, with people in more developed countries taking more pride in them.⁸ But whether the arts are defined as national is problematic and probably depends both on traditions and on historically specific coincidences of interests of national elites, artists, and art consumers. Pride in the arts and literature may be weaker in the new nations, since they have had less time to produce a heritage of these things; but local elites may be successful in attaching pride to pre-cursor heritages or in redefining works of art or literature as nation-specific (Kiely *et al.* 2001). Postmaterialism implies a positive association between actual economic performance and pride in the arts and literature—only those who have achieved economic success will develop widespread national feelings about aesthetic matters. Literature may be less important to national feelings in countries that have a shared language with other countries, because the country's claim to the literature is less exclusive (Bader 1997, Corse 1995, Moulin 1997). Non-comparable areas, for example poetry, may be especially good for small states (Matthews 1996, Waldstreicher 1995).

5 Other sources of national pride

We provide a detailed investigation of these areas of pride, and set them in context with a more cursory investigation of other zones of national pride: (a) the *military* because of its traditional association with the modern nation-state;

⁸ It moreover implies a negative association of pride in the arts and literature with pride in the military.

(b) the *redistribution* system because it is one of the key things that the nation-state does (although the scope of duty of the state towards its poorer citizens and the scope of its rights to extract wealth from its prosperous citizens remains controversial, and the role that contentment with this plays in national feeling is unclear) (Isaac 1996); (c) the country's political role, both *how democracy works at home*, and (d) the *nation's political influence abroad*; (e) *equality of opportunity*, the country's fair and equal treatment of all members of its society; and (f) *the nation's history*.⁹ Each of these zones of national pride deserves a full investigation on its own, but the four we focus on seem to be a reasonable place to begin.

CULTURE AREAS AND NATIONAL PRIDE

Extensive survey evidence suggesting that globalization has not eroded national identity, and renewed interest in cultural differences (e.g., Knudsen 1997, Landes 2000) make it important to pursue the hypothesis of persistent cultural differences in national pride. What culture areas one can examine depend on data availability; ours are limited to Europe and its overseas extensions, plus two Asian countries.

The *Nordic countries*¹⁰ are expected to be proud, but moderately so, in most domains (Allardt 2000). Having concentrated their postwar energies on economic redistribution in a democratic framework (Esping-Andersen 1994, Knudsen 1997), we would expect them to be very proud of their democratic systems, proud of their economies, and proud of their redistribution (social security) systems. Although they had a very bellicose past in Viking days, and an aggressively militaristic monarchy into the eighteenth century, their twentieth-century orientation has had a decidedly anti-military slant (Thompson 1997).

The *Germanic countries*¹¹ should be especially proud of their arts and literature (Giesen 1998) in view of the tremendous and continuing international influence of their music in the Baroque, Classical, and early Romantic periods—few can boast the like of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven (e.g. Ballantine 1999, DeNora 1995).¹² For Germany and Austria, the painful history of the Second World War is expected to linger as especially low pride in the military. The great energy and determination that these countries devoted to rebuilding their post-World War II economies is expected to show up in high levels of pride in their economies, and high levels of pride in their redistribution (social security)

⁹ Pride in history may surprise outsiders, reflecting the history that is taught in government schools rather than the history the rest of the world perceives (Schuman and Corning 2000, Zajda 2000).

¹⁰ Sweden and Norway are the countries in our dataset. For brevity, we sometimes refer to them as the 'Scandinavia' or the 'Nordic countries' although neither Finland nor Denmark is in the dataset.

¹¹ This includes Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands (meaning that the Dutch language has its origins as a Germanic dialect, not that modern Dutch people speak modern High German).

¹² Their most obvious rival, Italy, is also expected to take great pride in its arts and literature.

system. We have grouped the former East Germany in the German-language group, both (1) because their cultural roots are there and the Communist period did not erode their identity as Germans (Phillips 1996), and (2) because West German generosity greatly eased their transition beyond Communism (Dalton 1994).

We would expect the *post-Communist countries*¹³ to be especially lacking in pride in their economies, both because of a sense of betrayal in that economic stagnation undermined Communism's central claim to be providing prosperity for all (Dalton 1994) and because they were still actually very poor in the mid-1990s. Research on subjective well-being suggests that the economic difficulties were causing hardship, but that this did not contaminate positive feelings in other domains of life (Titma *et al.* 1997). Moreover, economic difficulties have not reduced democratic aspirations here (Evans and Whitefield 1995), so it may not reduce attachment to the nation either. By contrast, pride in the arts, in history, and perhaps in sport should survive the exit from Communism pretty well on the argument that the national feelings in these countries—except perhaps Russia—were not locked into the Communist regimes, and so did not suffer when the regimes fell (Joppke 1995, Weiner 1996). On the other hand, other scholars have argued that the Communist period nearly eradicated national feeling in these countries (Wozniakowski 1997).

Among the *English-language countries*, science should be a special source of pride, both because of their success at it and because it provides a good vehicle for national feelings in multi-ethnic societies (Kelley 1996), which they mostly are. They have successful martial traditions, although the withdrawal from the colonies in the early post-World War II period may have diminished pride in the military in Britain. None of the English-language countries is distinguished in the visual arts or music, although certainly there were great achievements in literature in the late medieval and early modern periods. Their individualist tradition should mean that redistribution is felt as painful necessity rather than an achievement, and hence they would be expected to take little pride in their redistribution systems.

Also worth addressing is the question of US exceptionalism (Lipset 1979, 1998)—in what ways national feelings in the USA differ from the rest of the world. For example, the US retained the language, the individualistic culture, the practice of self-government, and substantial traditions of institutional design from Britain. But did its revolutionary origins leave it very different in the dimensions it emphasizes in national pride? Is it very different from other English-speaking settler countries whose separation from Britain was peaceful and relatively recent? Very different from other rich countries? The answers

¹³ Our ex-Communist countries are all largely Slavic-language countries (except Hungary), so the hypotheses and results do not necessarily generalize to the Middle Eastern and Asian countries born in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

should help to illuminate how powerful and useful are the conceptual dimensions on which we can array countries, or whether one had best revert to a more idiopathic approach.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

To investigate such questions, the International Social Survey Programme's 1995–96 'National Identity' survey, designed by Max Haller and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar (1992), asked questions about pride—or lack of it—in a nation's achievements in 24 countries. In all, there are 30,894 interviews.

These data, together with a complete specification of all analyses in the paper, are available for downloading from the internet in a form convenient for re-analysis at www.international-survey.org.¹⁴

All 24 surveys use large, representative national samples. Attitude items were asked exactly in the same way in all nations, providing one of the most comparable cross-national data sets on the topic.¹⁵ Comparisons with the national census, where available, show the surveys to be representative in age, education, occupation, and industry, although women are over-represented in several surveys (Bean 1991, Kelley and Evans 1999, Sikora 1997, Zentralarchiv 1998).

The ISSP surveys mostly began with interviews with a stratified random sample followed by a leave-behind self-completion questionnaire with the ISSP items; several were conducted entirely by mail and some entirely by interview. Several of the mail surveys were simple random samples but the others involved various forms of clustering. Completion rates (defined as completions/(completions plus refusals)) averaged around 60 percent, counting losses at the interview and the drop-off stages. (For details on the sampling techniques and response rates for each country, see www.issp.org). These rates compare favourably with recent experiences in many industrial nations (e.g., the highly regarded 1989 International Crime Victim Survey averaged 41 percent over 14 nations (van Dijk *et al.* 1990)). The ISSP surveys are listed in the Technical Appendix.

We begin with descriptive statistics on the various domains of national pride; then assess correlations among the domains; and then use regression analysis to model the sources of national pride, and to model the impact of the different domains of national pride on national attachment. These analyses control for social differences at the individual level. The exact models are in the Technical Appendix.

¹⁴ These are the second edition of the data which include Australia. The first edition of the data, which are less complete but more extensively documented, are available from the Zentralarchiv (1998) at the University of Cologne.

¹⁵ Each country also collected background data and demographic variables to a high standard of accuracy, using questions appropriate to local circumstances and institutions. They were recoded to a common standard by the Zentralarchiv and ourselves.

RESULTS

PRIDE IN SCIENCE

The question asks 'How proud are you of (country name) in each of the following . . . ' followed by a list of zones of potential national pride (Table 1). We begin with pride in science and technology.

The Germanic countries invented the research university and have a strong tradition of scientific research, but what do their people think? Most are proud of their nation's achievements in science and technology: 26 percent 'very proud' and fully 59 percent 'proud'. Only 13 percent say they are 'not very proud' and 2 percent say that they are 'not proud at all'. We summarize this compactly by the mean on a points-out-of-100 basis—where 'very proud' gets 100, and 'not proud at all' gets 0, with intermediate answers given scores at equal intervals in between (Evans *et al.* 1992, pp. 468–9, Wegener 1982). Scored in this simple way,¹⁶ the average for Germanic countries is 70.

Turning to other countries, the percentage for 'very proud' is highest in the USA at 51 percent (the mean is 82 points out of 100). Next, although well behind, come the rest of the English-speaking countries at 37 percent 'very proud', and with a mean score of 76 points out of 100. The German-speaking countries and Scandinavian countries come next at 26 percent and 22 percent respectively. Next come the 'other' market economies where 18 percent are 'very proud' (mean of 62) and the formerly Communist countries where 15 percent say they are 'very proud' (mean of 55). These are all single-peaked, well-behaved distributions well represented by their means.

We reserve most of the theoretical discussion for the country-by-country analysis below, but there are several points that should be made here. (1) Contrary to the globalizing-institutions hypothesis, many people in a number of countries attach national feelings to scientific and technological advances. (2) The civilizing-process hypothesis receives some support and but is also undermined to an extent. The supporting result is that large majorities feel either 'proud' or 'very proud' of their nation's science in all the country groups. The undermining result is the evident differentiation among the developed country groups. In particular, the English-speaking world takes more pride in their science than do their European counterparts in the Norse- or German-speaking worlds, and American exceptionalism is also evident.

¹⁶ This 'equal interval' scoring is often used in attitude research and has the advantage of putting everything in a clear 0 to 100 metric. Any scoring that preserves equal intervals between answer categories (for example, Likert scoring them as 1, 2, 3, and 4) produces identical standardized coefficients and metric coefficients that are a simple linear transformation of our coefficients. Alternative estimates that assume only the order of classes (Joreskog and Sorbom 1989, p. 223), or multinomial logit methods also preserving the order of the answer categories, in practice produce virtually identical conclusions (Kelley and Evans 2002).

TABLE 1 Frequency distributions and means for national pride questions by country group

Question: How proud are you of [country] in each of the following ... ' Percents read down.

	USA	Other English- speaking	Ger- manic	Nordic	Other market	Eastern Europe
<i>Scientific and technological achievements</i>						
Very proud (100 points)	51	37	26	22	18	15
Proud (67 points)	44	54	59	61	56	47
Not very proud (33 points)	4	8	13	16	19	26
Not proud at all (0 points)	1	2	2	2	6	12
Total = 100 % (mean points)	(82)	(76)	(70)	(68)	(62)	(55)
<i>Achievements in art and literature</i>						
Very proud	31	35	20	18	32	31
Proud	57	54	54	56	54	51
Not very proud	9	10	21	23	11	14
Not proud at all	3	2	5	4	3	4
Total = 100 % (mean points)	(72)	(74)	(63)	(62)	(72)	(70)
<i>Achievements in sports</i>						
Very proud	38	47	28	40	28	30
Proud	51	44	52	47	58	45
Not very proud	8	8	15	10	12	18
Not proud at all	4	2	6	3	3	6
Total = 100 % (mean points)	(74)	(78)	(67)	(75)	(70)	(66)
<i>Economic achievements</i>						
Very proud	29	12	21	12	13	5
Proud	53	48	60	39	41	21
Not very proud	15	33	16	31	32	40
Not proud at all	3	7	3	18	15	34
Total = 100 % (mean points)	(69)	(55)	(66)	(48)	(50)	(32)
<i>Other achievements (mean points)</i>						
Armed forces	(79)	(68)	(39)	(41)	(49)	(44)
History	(78)	(72)	(55)	(64)	(71)	(72)
The way democracy works	(70)	(65)	(61)	(62)	(49)	(34)
Political influence	(66)	(58)	(52)	(56)	(41)	(38)
Fair treatment of all groups	(55)	(55)	(50)	(45)	(46)	(35)
Social security system	(51)	(54)	(64)	(56)	(45)	(24)
Number of cases	1276	6594	4424	2417	4454	8049

Data: International Social Survey Programme's 'National Identity' module, 1995-96. Number of cases varies slightly depending on missing data; numbers shown are for science and technology.

PRIDE IN THE ARTS AND LITERATURE

Do these patterns also hold for national pride in the arts and literature? The percentages 'very proud' of their nation's art and literature all fall into the range

18 percent to 35 percent, with substantial majorities feeling either 'very proud' or 'proud' in all country groups (Table 1).¹⁷ There is less differentiation here than in the case of pride in science, both within the West and between Western and Eastern Europe. The latter result is clearly contrary to the postmaterialism hypothesis. There is no sign of American exceptionalism, and no sign that globalization is eroding the country-specific quality of at least some art and literature. It is perhaps surprising that Americans think so well of their art and literature, and that the German-speaking peoples do not think better of theirs, issues to which we shall return. It is noteworthy that the formerly Communist countries of East-Central and Eastern Europe are much prouder of the arts and literature than of their science. But the opposite is true of the Scandinavian countries, the Germanic countries, and the anglophone countries, including the USA.

PRIDE IN SPORTS

Sport elicits feelings of national pride in many breasts throughout the developed world: substantial majorities feel 'proud' or 'very proud' of sport in all the country groups in the survey (Table 1). The percentage 'very proud' ranges from 28 to 30 percent in the German-speaking countries, in Eastern Europe, and in the 'other' market economies, with the USA and Scandinavia somewhat higher at 38 to 40 percent, and the non-US anglophone countries topping the list at 47 percent. Means range from lows of 66 to 70 points in the Germanic countries, and the largely Slavic-language countries of Central-East and Eastern Europe, to a high of 78 points in the non-US anglophone countries.

PRIDE IN ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS

Economic achievements are not so clearly a matter of pride (Table 1). Here the fraction of the populace feeling 'very proud' ranges from a low of 5 percent in the formerly Communist countries to 29 percent in the USA. Means range from a low of 32 points in the largely Slavonic-language ex-Communist countries; to averages near 50 in the Nordic countries and the non-US English-speaking countries; with the highest means—in the high 60s—among Americans and the German-speaking countries.

The postmaterialism hypothesis implies uniformly low pride in the economy, as national feelings disengage from the taken-for-granted material base. That is clearly not true, as national pride in the economy is high in the Germanic countries (66) and in the USA (69), but very low in Scandinavia (48) and

¹⁷ These are all single-peaked, well-behaved distributions well represented by their means.

Eastern Europe (32). Here again there is American exceptionalism, with the USA (69) much higher than the remainder of the English-speaking world (55).¹⁸

OTHER SOURCES OF PRIDE

How do groups of nations compare on various other sources of pride (Table 1, last panel)? First, consider the evidence on the erosion of national feeling. If national feeling were eroding, it should be low on all dimensions in all countries. For operational purposes, take low to mean below the neutral point of 50 on the 100 point scale. So defined, national pride is not low on any dimension in the USA or the other anglophone countries. It is low on only one out of ten topics in the German-language countries (the military). The Scandinavian countries' achievements inspire little pride in the breasts of their citizens on three out of the ten topics. The peoples of the 'other market economies' do not feel much national pride in five of the ten topics. In the Eastern European countries, six of the ten topics rate less than 50.

Because we do not have data over time, we cannot say whether national pride is in decline, but the data certainly show that it has not disappeared. Thus, neither economic nor institutional globalization seems to have melted away national feelings.

Does pride in the armed forces follow a declining gradient across levels of development, as anticipated by the civilizing-process hypothesis? The answer seems to be 'no'. Pride in the armed forces is highest in the USA at 79 points out of 100, followed by 68 for the rest of the English-speaking world; next come the 'other market economies' at 49, then East Central and Eastern Europe at 44, with the Nordic and German-language countries at 39 and 41 respectively. This puts the most developed countries in the world at both ends of the spectrum of pride in the nation's martial achievements, clear evidence against the civilizing-process hypothesis. The fact that the USA stands out as exceptionally proud of their military supports the American-exceptionalism hypothesis.¹⁹

Governments throughout the developed world devote vast resources to economic redistribution, but do their citizens take pride in their redistribution systems ('social security system' in Germany and England, variant local wording elsewhere)? Denizens of the German-speaking countries are the proudest of their system, rating it 64, on average. The German-language countries' system may devour their future, by heaping economic burdens on those in the child-bearing age ranges, but the people themselves seem quite content with it, at least in the mid-1990s. Next proudest are the Scandinavians, 56 points, and

¹⁸ We will return later to the link between economic pride and actual economic performance.

¹⁹ Many students of American national identity have noted a strong martial theme (e.g. Marvin and Ingle 1998).

the non-US English-speaking countries at 54, with the Americans fractionally lower at 51. The largely Slavonic-language countries of Eastern Europe average 24. The Scandinavian rating seems surprisingly low, but the recession of the early 1990s hit hard there and various other factors may have also have (probably temporarily) shaken faith in the 'Nordic model' (Allardt 2000).

The areas in which the formerly Communist countries take the most pride are their history (72), arts and literature (70), and sport (68). The Scandinavians' top three areas are sport (75), science (68), and history (64). The German-language countries take the most pride in their science (70), sport (67), and economy (66). The non-US English speaking countries feel proudest of their sport (78), science (76), and arts and literature (74). The areas of greatest pride in the USA are science (82), the military (79), and history (78). These lists are neither completely homogeneous nor heterogeneous, recurrent themes are woven through, but are not universal. In five of the six groups, sport is among the top three, making it perhaps the most widely dispersed source of pride. The USA is partially exceptional' here—science and technology and history also occur in other groups top three' areas, but the occurrence of the military in the top three is unique to the USA.

CORRELATIONS AMONG DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF PRIDE

Correlations at the individual level cast light on several hypotheses. Contrary to the civilizing-process hypothesis, the correlation between pride in the armed forces and pride in science is not negative, but rather is moderately positive (.34). This is also true of the correlations of martial pride and pride in art and literature (.29), and of martial pride and pride in sport (.35). Thus, neither between nations, nor within nations do these data provide any support for the civilizing-process hypothesis.

Similarly, there is no support here for the postmaterialist hypothesis that pride in the economy would have a negative association with pride in play' activities: instead, pride in the nation's economy is positively correlated with pride in science and technology (.39), positively correlated with pride in the arts and literature (.19), and positively correlated with national pride in sport (.25). Thus, to supplement the largely negative findings at the national level, these are completely negative findings at the individual level. Economic development does not seem to turn people into aesthetes or absent-minded professors indifferent to economic success.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Thus, the findings presented in Table 1 provide (1) no support for the hypothesis that globalizing institutions have eroded national feeling; (2) no support for the

hypothesis that a globalizing economy has eroded national feelings; (3) no support for the hypothesis that the civilizing process would lessen pride in the military as nations develop; (4) no support for the hypothesis that the civilizing process would result in pride in the arts and literature being higher in more developed countries; (5) no support for the hypothesis that the civilizing process would result in pride in sport being higher in more developed countries; (6) largely negative findings as regards the postmaterialism hypothesis; (7) mixed findings as regards the American exceptionalism hypothesis; and (8) substantial support for the hypothesis of persisting cultural differences.

NATIONAL DIFFERENCES, NET OF COMPOSITION

The results presented thus far emphasize international variability. This makes it intriguing to take a closer look at the individual countries rather than just the broad country groups presented thus far—with adjustments for compositional differences among the countries to ensure that observed differences do not simply reflect their population composition. Specifically, we adjust by regression for differences in age structure, gender, education, and migration history. Details are in the Technical Appendix.

PRIDE IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

There is diversity both between and within groups of nations on the issue of science and technology (Table 2, left-hand Panel). Average levels of pride in science and technology cover a 19-point span in the English-speaking countries, ranging from 63 points in Ireland to 82 in the USA. The UK and Irish Republic ratings are in the range found throughout northwest and central Europe—60 to 69. Ex-East Germany closely resembles ex-West Germany. Ratings in the other ex-Communist countries are concentrated in the forties and fifties, as is also the rating for the Philippines, the only developing country in the study.

Both the intensity and the content of Japanese national feeling are matters of on-going scholarly controversy (e.g. Deng 1997, Gao 2000, Landes 2000, Youth Development Headquarters 1994), but in terms of national pride in science and technology, they are very close to other developed countries—their mean of 66 puts them above Italy, Spain, Germany, Norway, and Sweden.

Americans take more pride in science and technology than do the citizens of any other nation in the study. All in all, there is substantial differentiation within the developed world, lending further support to the view of persistent national variation.

Moving beyond nation-by-nation differences, several broad patterns emerge (Table 2, Panel B). Citizens of small nations are a little more proud of their science and technology than are their peers in large counties. English-speaking

TABLE 2 **Pride in the nation's scientific and technological achievements and in its arts and literature**

Panel A: Raw means; means adjusted by regression for differences between nations in their population's age, gender, education, and migration history; and significance of differences between nations (USA = reference category).^a

Panel B: Groups of nations.^b

<i>Pride in science and technology</i>			<i>Pride in arts and literature</i>		
<i>English speaking</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Adjusted</i>		<i>Mean</i>	<i>Adjusted</i>
United States	82	82 (ref)	Ireland	85	83 higher
Australia	79	73 lower	New Zealand	76	75 same
New Zealand	77	71 lower	Canada	73	71 same
Canada	76	71 lower	United States	72	72 (ref)
Great Britain	72	66 lower	Australia	72	71 same
Ireland	69	63 lower	Great Britain	67	65 lower
<i>Germanic nations</i>					
Austria	75	68 lower	Austria	72	71 same
East Germany	70	64 lower	East Germany	68	66 lower
Netherlands	69	63 lower	Netherlands	60	58 lower
West Germany	68	61 lower	West Germany	60	59 lower
<i>Scandinavia</i>					
Sweden	70	64 lower	Norway	63	62 lower
Norway	66	60 lower	Sweden	61	61 lower
<i>Other established market economies</i>					
Japan	73	66 lower	Italy	81	80 higher
Italy	65	59 lower	Japan	73	71 same
Spain	59	53 lower	Spain	70	69 lower
Philippines	52	46 lower	Philippines	63	62 lower
<i>Eastern Europe</i>					
Hungary	67	60 lower	Bulgaria	77	75 same
Russia	62	56 lower	Hungary	74	72 same
Slovenia	56	51 lower	Latvia	73	71 same
Bulgaria	55	49 lower	Czech Republic	72	70 same
Czech Republic	53	48 lower	Russia	71	70 lower
Poland	52	46 lower	Slovenia	68	67 lower
Slovakia	47	43 lower	Slovakia	67	65 lower
Latvia	47	42 lower	Poland	59	58 lower
<i>PANEL B: Groups</i>					
		<i>b (significance)</i>			<i>b (significance)</i>
Small nations		+ 1 ($p < .001$)	Small nations		+ 0.7 (n.s.)
English-speaking nations		+ 10 ($p < .001$)	English-speaking nations		+ 7 ($p < .001$)
Other market economies		- (reference)	Other market economies		- (reference)
Ex-Communist nations		- 10 ($p < .001$)	Ex-Communist nations		+ 3 ($p < .001$)

Data: International Social Survey 'National Identity' module, 1995-96.

^a Statistical significance of differences is at $p < .01$, two-tailed, for the adjusted means.

^b Ordinary least squares regression. See the Technical Appendix for details.

countries generally take more pride in their nation's science and technology—about 10 points more than other long-established market economies. In contrast, ex-Communist nations²⁰ have much less pride in their science and technology, about 10 points below Western Europe (and so 20 points below the English-speaking nations).²¹

PRIDE IN ARTS AND LITERATURE

Pride in achievements in the arts and literature is very diverse (Table 2, right-hand Panel). The greatest pride is felt by the Irish, with 83 points out of 100: they do indeed seem to see themselves as the land of poets; the Italians are not far behind. Next comes a broad, highly diverse middle group with scores in the low 70s: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, and the USA. Next, just a little lower, comes a large lower-middle group, also diverse. It includes Russia and several other east-central European nations, as well as Spain and Britain. Towards the bottom with scores in the low 60s are the Scandinavian nations, despite their epic tradition, and the Philippines, the latter being especially interesting in light of its mixed linguistic heritage (Weekley 1999). Poland, the Netherlands, and ex-West Germany come last. On this topic the US sits anonymously in the middle.

Some of these results are surprising—for example that Britain, the land of Shakespeare and Milton—takes so little pride in its achievements in the arts and literature; that Germany with its splendid musical tradition comes so low; and that the Dutch take so little pride in the likes of Rembrandt and Vermeer with their huge influence on painting. Future research will be needed here.

Looking beyond the country-by-country results reveals a few broad patterns (Table 2, Panel B). English-speaking peoples generally have more pride in their nation's arts and literature, about 7 points more than other long-established market economies.²² This runs counter to a hypothesis that countries in multi-national language groups would take less pride in their literature (Corse 1995). The ex-Communist nations take a little more pride in their nation's arts and literature, by about 3 points.²³ There is a significant, but small, size effect,

²⁰ This sample of nations blurs the distinction between poverty and Communism, since all the poorer European nations were in the Communist bloc. The only poor non-communist nation is the Philippines.

²¹ We are inclined to think that these are substantive differences rather than matters of translation that make the English-speakers tend to use the top end of the scale and the Slavic-language speakers the low end of the scale, because the international differences vary among the remaining topics in subsequent tables.

²² Does this reflect the large pool of English-speaking writers compared to the small pool of, for example, Norwegian or Bulgarian writers? The fact that large nations do not, in general, take greater pride in their literature argues against it.

²³ The fact that ex-communist, mostly Slavic-language countries are more proud of their arts and literature whereas they were less proud of their science allays concern that translation difficulties might have disproportionately led the Slavic language answers to tilt towards the negative end of the scale. Similarly, the fact that the English language advantage is only one-third the size that it was on science and technology means that the observed differences cannot be dismissed as mere translation issues.

with denizens of small countries taking more pride in their arts and literature; that is consistent with the claim that small nations concentrate their national feelings in non-comparable areas (Matthews 1996), but the parallel finding that smaller nations are also keener on their science and technology runs counter to that claim.

ACHIEVEMENTS IN SPORTS

Here again there is very substantial international diversity (Table 3). Even after adjustment for differences in population composition, scores cover a huge range from 41 to 85, with great differentiation evident within most of the country groups. New Zealanders and the Irish take the greatest pride in their nation's sporting success, with adjusted scores in the middle 80s, followed by the Bulgarians and Australians in the high 70s. Next comes a diverse group with scores in the middle 70s: Austria, Norway, Slovenia, and the USA. Other nations are yet lower: Britain, Canada, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Russia with scores in the 60s. East Germans are at this level too—their signal successes in international sport under the former Communist regime perhaps offset by drug scandals. The Philippines, several east-central European nations, and West Germany are toward the bottom. Poland comes last.²⁴

There are some interesting broader patterns in these data (Table 3, Panel B). Most strikingly, citizens of smaller nations are noticeably prouder of their nation's sporting achievements, about 9 points higher than citizens of large nations. English-speaking peoples generally have more pride in their nation's sports achievements as well, about 8 points more than citizens of other long-established market economies. Surprisingly, ex-Communist nations take less pride in their nation's sporting successes, by about 5 points.

PRIDE IN ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS

Citizens of the various nations differ greatly in how much pride they take in their country's economic performance (Table 3, right-hand Panel). After adjustment, the scores range from 17, on average, among Hungarians to 69 among Americans. Americans and the Irish take the greatest pride in their nation's economic performance, with scores in the high 60s. The high Irish score is, perhaps, a testimony to the effects of international redistribution via supra-national organizations (here, the European Union) enhancing national feelings! West Germany is only a fraction behind.²⁵ Austrians, the Japanese,

²⁴ Here again, the finding of diversity is contrary to the globalizing-institutions hypothesis, the globalizing-economy hypothesis, the civilizing-process hypothesis or the postmaterialism hypothesis.

²⁵ Some have worried that the intense focus of German national feeling in the postwar period on economic success would make life doubly troublesome during inevitable economic downturns (Pan 1995). The ISSP data show that Germans are, indeed, proud of their economy, but they take pride in other things, too, so, contrary to these concerns, they have not put all their eggs in one basket.

TABLE 3 **Pride in the nation's achievements in sports and in its economic achievements**

Panel A: Raw means; means adjusted by regression for differences between nations in their population's age, gender, education, and migration history; and significance of differences between nations (USA = reference category).^a

Panel B: Groups of nations.^b

<i>Pride in sporting achievements</i>			<i>Pride in economic achievements</i>		
<i>English speaking</i>	<i>Mean Adjusted</i>			<i>Mean Adjusted</i>	
Ireland	88	85 higher	United States	69	69 (reference)
New Zealand	87	85 higher	Ireland	69	67 same
Australia	80	77 higher	New Zealand	61	59 lower
United States	74	74 (reference)	Canada	55	53 lower
Canada	72	69 lower	Australia	50	48 lower
Great Britain	65	61 lower	Great Britain	47	44 lower
<i>Germanic nations</i>					
Austria	77	72 lower	West Germany	69	66 lower
East Germany	69	64 lower	Austria	68	65 lower
Netherlands	67	63 lower	East Germany	68	64 lower
West Germany	58	53 lower	Netherlands	63	60 lower
<i>Scandinavia</i>					
Norway	79	75 same	Norway	66	64 lower
Sweden	71	67 lower	Sweden	28	25 lower
<i>Other established market economies</i>					
Italy	72	67 lower	Japan	68	65 lower
Spain	71	65 lower	Philippines	48	44 lower
Japan	69	65 lower	Spain	44	40 lower
Philippines	67	60 lower	Italy	40	37 lower
<i>Eastern Europe</i>					
Bulgaria	85	79 higher	Czech Republic	44	41 lower
Slovenia	79	74 same	Slovenia	40	38 lower
Hungary	75	69 lower	Slovakia	36	34 lower
Russia	69	64 lower	Poland	36	33 lower
Latvia	64	61 lower	Bulgaria	32	29 lower
Czech Republic	62	59 lower	Latvia	29	26 lower
Slovakia	61	56 lower	Russia	22	20 lower
Poland	46	41 lower	Hungary	21	17 lower
<i>PANEL B: Groups</i>					
		<i>b (significance)</i>			<i>b (significance)</i>
Small nations		+9 ($p < .001$)	Small nations		0 (n.s.)
English-speaking nations		+8 ($p < .001$)	English-speaking nations		+2 ($p < .001$)
Other market economies		– (reference)	Other market economies		– (reference)
Ex-Communist nations		–5 ($p < .001$)	Ex-Communist nations		–21 ($p < .001$)

Data: International Social Survey 'National Identity' module, 1995–96.

^a Statistical significance of differences is at $p < .01$, two-tailed, for the adjusted means.

^b Ordinary least squares regression. See the Technical Appendix for details.

(surprisingly) East Germans, and Norwegians are just a shade lower. Next with scores around 60 are the Dutch and New Zealanders. Canadians are noticeably lower. Australians are lower yet, around the middle of the international rankings. Interestingly, Filipinos are just a shade lower, still in the middle of the international rankings, and tied with Britain. Then, with below average levels of pride, come the east-central European nations in the post-Communist doldrums. Spain and Italy have similar levels of pride in their economies. Surprisingly, Sweden is also near the bottom. Finally at the foot of the list come Russia and Hungary, with scores around 20.

By and large, citizens of richer nations take more pride in their nation's economic performance, in line with prior findings that people's perceptions of the macroeconomic situation are largely correct (Hibbs 1979) and also in line with the economic globalization hypothesis that people rate their nation's economy in terms of a single international hierarchy, rather than in terms of local hierarchies. For example, the USA and Germany both top the rankings and are among the richest nations in the world, while Russia and the east-central European nations are both low in the rankings and objectively poor.

But absolute levels of prosperity are not the whole story: the *direction* of change may matter too. The Irish are bursting with economic pride despite being much poorer than the USA and West Germany, the other countries that share their exalted ranking. The Irish economy has grown rapidly in recent years, amply assisted by subsidies from the European Community, and that may well be the reason. And at the other extreme Sweden is near the bottom of the rankings despite being much richer than comparably pessimistic nations like Russia and Latvia. However, the Swedish economy, previously a widely admired model of social democratic economic organization, had done poorly over the last decade.²⁶ So economic growth may be one of the things that gives citizens pride in their nation's economy, while economic stagnation undermines pride even in nations that remain objectively wealthy.

But economic growth and decline do not tell the whole story either. One of the most surprising results is the pride Filipinos take in their nation's economic achievements despite their nation's poverty and unremarkable growth rate.²⁷ Their GNP per capita is only around 11 percent of US levels, and growing at a modest 1.5 percent per year.²⁸ Other nations near their level of economic pride are mostly around 70 percent of US GNP. This would seem to be a striking piece of evidence against the economic-globalization hypothesis that all

²⁶ Over the decade 1985–95, high income economies grew at an average of about 2 percent a year (World Bank 1997, p. 215). Ireland did much better, growing at over 5 percent while Sweden declined fractionally at –0.1 percent a year.

²⁷ It is all the more striking in light of scholars' arguments that the Philippines' history as a source country for sojourner labor migrants has left a legacy of national feelings of shame as regards the economy (Aguilar 2000).

²⁸ World Bank (1997, p. 214). Growth is for the period 1985–95.

will be measuring themselves against the richest nations in the newly globalized market.

The most striking general pattern in pride in the economy is that citizens of formerly Communist nations take a grim view of their nations' economic achievements, fully 21 points below other, more prosperous, nations. This is consistent with the view that Communism's failure was primarily economic.²⁹

THE SIZE OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Further evidence of the diversity of national feelings is provided by the fact that there are substantial differences among nations in the degree of pride they take in various activities. Differences among nations are smallest in the arts, larger in science and in sport, and largest in economic performance. Most nations find something to be proud of in their arts and literature. The difference between those who think they have the least to admire (Poland, West Germany, and the Netherlands, with adjusted scores just under 60) and those with the most to be proud of (Ireland, Italy, and Bulgaria, with unadjusted scores around 80) is 21 points out of 100. We suspect that the arts are sufficiently numerous, and styles sufficiently diverse, that almost every nation can excel in something; while literature and poetry in the local languages has an in-built advantage over writings in foreign languages.

Differences in science and technology are larger. Countries with few achievements in science and technology to feel proud of (the Philippines, Slovakia, and Latvia, with scores around 45) are fully 32 points behind the leaders (the USA, Australia, and New Zealand, with scores around 75). While not so diverse as arts and literature, science has many separate fields in which a country can excel (for example, medicine in Australia).

Differences in sport are about the same size (with Poland, West Germany, and Slovakia at the bottom scoring around 55 compared to Ireland, New Zealand, and Bulgaria scoring close to 90). Sports, like science, has niches for many countries—rugby in New Zealand, weight-lifting in Bulgaria, or skiing in Norway, for example.

It is with respect to the economy that differences among nations are largest. Some countries feel that they do very poorly (Sweden, Russia, and Hungary, with adjusted scores around 20), while others do well (the USA, Germany, and Ireland, with scores near 70). The difference between top and bottom is fully 47 points.

²⁹ On the translation issue, note that the effects of belonging to a Slavic-language country varies not only in size, but also in direction between these various topics of pride, and that the size of the English-speaking effect varies from nugatory (on the economy) to moderately large (on science and technology). These results suggest that the observed differences are substantive rather than artefacts of translation.

TABLE 4 Who is proud of their nation's achievements in various areas? Standardized partial regression coefficients for the USA and other nations separately.^a 24 nations, 1995-96.

	<i>Science</i>	<i>Arts</i>	<i>Sport</i>	<i>Economy</i>
<i>Panel A: USA</i>				
Age	.15	.13	.06	.19
Male	.08	ns	.09	.06
Education	.13	ns	-.11	.07
Immigrant	ns	ns	ns	ns
Born in this city	ns	ns	ns	ns
Lived abroad	ns	ns	ns	ns
(R-squared)	(.05)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)
<i>Panel B: Other nations</i>				
Age	.09	.06	ns	.04
Male	ns	-.09	ns	ns
Education	-.02	.06	-.09	-.04
Immigrant	ns	-.04	-.03	ns
Born in this city	ns	ns	.02	ns
Lived abroad	ns	ns	-.04	ns
(R-squared)	(.15)	(.08)	(.15)	(.26)

Data: International Social Survey 'National Identity' module, 1995-96. Number of cases is 1,276 for Panel A and 25,938 for Panel B, varying slightly due to missing data.

ns = not statistically significant, $p < .01$, two-tailed.

^a National differences, measured by a set of 22 dummy variables, are controlled but not shown in Panel B.

WHO IS PROUD OF THEIR NATION'S ACHIEVEMENTS?

Thus far, we have focused on differences among nations, and on national diversity adjusted for differences in population characteristics, but some of the hypotheses also have implications for social differences among individuals. We now turn to these issues (Table 4).

AGE

If globalization reduces national feeling, then older people ought to be more proud of arts and literature, science, sport, and their economy than are younger people, according to the generational replacement or cohort replacement hypothesis (e.g. Abramson and Inglehart 1992). If the civilizing process is at work, then younger people ought to be more proud than older people of arts and literature, science, sport, and their economy. If the postmaterialist hypothesis well describes national feeling, then younger people ought to be more proud of arts and literature, science, sport, but older people should be more proud of the economy.

In fact, older people are more proud than the young of their nation's science and technology, its arts and literature, and its economy, but old and young are equally proud of sport (Table 4). Thus, three of the four age effects are positive, as the globalization hypotheses would predict, but their variation in size and the null association between age and pride in sport are contrary to the uniform positive association anticipated by the globalization hypotheses. Even more dramatically, these results are opposite in direction to predictions of the civilizing-process and the postmaterialist hypotheses. On the hypothesis of US exceptionalism, the age differences discovered by the regression analysis are larger in the USA than among the people of the rest of our sample of nations, indicating either a different aging process, or a sharper historical change there.

GENDER

Gender differences are variable and mostly small (Table 4). Men and women take equal pride in their nation's science and technology, its sport, and its economy, but men are less proud than women of their nation's arts and literature (standardized regression coefficient of $-.09$). These results are consistent with prior complex and relatively weak findings on gender differences in national feelings (Moghadam 1995). Gender differences are more evident in the USA.

EDUCATION

Several of the hypotheses lead to clear predictions about the effects of education. The globalizing-institutions hypothesis implies that, as the educated are better informed about supra- and transnational institutions, they will be more likely to employ an international perspective and hence will take less pride than their less educated peers who make only local comparisons. In concrete terms, that suggests that education should have negative effects on pride in science and technology, on pride in the economy, and on pride in sport, but education should have no effect on pride in the arts and literature where comparisons at all levels of education will be local. The civilizing-process hypothesis suggests positive effects of education in all these domains. The postmaterialism hypothesis suggests positive effects of education on pride in science, on pride in the arts, and on pride in sport, but a negative effect on pride in the economy.

In fact, education has a very small negative effect on pride in science and technology, a small positive effect on pride in the arts and literature, a middle-sized negative effect on national pride in sport, and a small negative effect on pride in the economy (Table 4). This pattern of results is consonant with none of the hypotheses. Here, the effects in the USA are greater in magnitude, and sometimes even different in direction, in particular, education

having a middle-sized positive effect on pride in science (in contrast to the small negative effect elsewhere).

EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN CULTURES

Immigration

The globalization hypotheses suggest that immigration undermines national feeling, suggesting that national pride should be lower on all dimensions among immigrants (Bader 1997). The other hypotheses have no clear implications concerning immigrants. Prior research suggests that connections of ethnicity with national feelings are complex (e.g. de la Garza *et al.* 1996, Sidanius *et al.* 1997).³⁰ In the 24 nations studied here, immigrants are just as proud as natives of their adopted nation's science and technology and of its technology, but a little less proud of its arts and literature and of its sport (Table 4).

Rootedness

The globalizing-institutions hypotheses suggests that staying in the town of one's birth may indicate limited horizons, and thus encourage local comparisons, thereby enhancing national pride on all dimensions. In fact, the regression analysis shows that those who remain in the city of their birth are no more (and no less) proud than their more mobile peers of their nation's science and technology, or of its arts and literature, or of its economy, but are a little more proud of its sport (Table 4).

Exposure to foreign culture

The globalizing-institutions hypothesis and postmaterialism hypothesis would see exposure to foreign lands as a mechanism undermining national feeling, and prior research suggests that it undermines the strength of national identity (Kelley 1995). Indeed, spending time abroad might engender feelings of national shame among labor exporting countries (Aguilar 2000). In the event, having lived abroad has no effect on national pride in science, in the arts and literature, or in the economy (Table 4), but slightly decreases pride in sport. This pattern of results is not consistent with the expectations of the globalizing-institutions hypothesis and of the postmaterialism hypothesis.

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

There is some evidence in favour of US exceptionalism in that some of the demographic and background effects in the USA are distinctive. For example,

³⁰ Research on ethnicity, immigration and national feelings has focused on attachment rather than pride, but the evidence there is mixed. US evidence is that strong ethnic attachment tends to be negatively associated with national identity (Bobo 1997), but that may not be true internationally (Dowley and Silver 2000).

TABLE 5 Frequency distributions and means on national attachment by country group

Question: How close—how emotionally attached—do you feel to [country]?'
 Percents read down.

	USA	Other English- speaking	Germanic	Nordic	Other market	Eastern Europe
Very close (<i>100 points</i>)	35	48	33	43	42	53
Close (<i>67 points</i>)	46	38	52	46	43	38
Not very close (<i>33 points</i>)	15	10	13	10	12	7
Not close at all (<i>0 points</i>)	4	4	2	1	3	3
Total = 100 % (mean points)	(71)	(77)	(72)	(77)	(75)	(80)

the effects of age on pride in science, on pride in the arts, and on pride in the economy are larger in the USA (standardized regression coefficients of .13 to .19, compared to .04 to .09 elsewhere). And on sport, age has a small to medium-sized positive effect in the USA compared to a very small negative effect in the rest of the world. Furthermore, education has a much more important effect on pride in science in the USA than in the rest of the world.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIDE

Does it matter whether people feel proud of their nation? We investigate one important possibility: that pride influences emotional attachment to the nation. Emotional attachment is measured by a direct question in a series asking about attachment to one's neighborhood, town, state, and nation (Table 5).

Most people feel close to their nation, 46 percent saying they are 'very close' and another 42 percent saying 'close'. Despite Americans' reputation for patriotism, they are not, in fact, unusually attached to their nation: in the other 23 nations in the study, attachment averages 77, somewhat higher than Americans' average of 71. Means range from the low 70s for the Germanic countries and the USA, to the middle 70s for other anglophone countries, and Scandinavia, to a high of 80 for the post-communist countries of east-central and Eastern Europe. At least on this question, national identity/attachment was alive and well (for better or for worse) in the mid-1990s throughout this range of countries.

FACTORS INFLUENCING ATTACHMENT TO ONE'S NATION

We argue that pride in a nation's achievements may increase people's feelings of attachment to the nation—that achievements can lead to pride and pride to

affection. However a plausible alternative would be that the causal link is the other way around: Feeling close to one's nation could lead one to take an over-optimistic view of its achievements in science, the economy, literature, and sports, and hence take false pride in them. While causal influences probably go both ways in practice, we would argue that, at a minimum, a substantial fraction of them go from achievement to pride and thence to attachment. There is clear evidence for this with respect to pride in economic achievement, where good objective measures of a nation's economic achievements is available to bring empirical evidence to bear on this difficult question (Kelley and Evans 2002).

On the assumption that pride is at least in part a cause of attachments, it seems that pride in the nation's scientific achievements, pride in the arts and literature, pride in sport, and pride in the economy can all influence national attachment/identity, but the patterns vary quite a bit among groups of nations (Table 6). Let us take as a baseline the large nations that are not English-speaking and are not ex-Communist. Among them, pride in science, pride in the arts, pride in sport, and pride in the economy all significantly enhance emotional attachment to the nation.

The effects of pride in sport and in the economy are the same in the English-speaking countries as in the baseline group of nations. But pride in science has about twice the impact on emotional attachment in the anglophone lands that it does in the baseline group. By contrast, pride in the arts has only about half the impact on national attachment in the English-language countries that it has in the baseline group.

In the ex-Communist nations, the impact of pride in science, pride in the arts, and pride in the economy on national attachment is the same as in the baseline countries. But pride in sport has no impact, in contrast to the significant effect in the baseline countries.

In small nations, the connections of pride to attachment are the same as in the baseline nations for science, art, and the economy. But pride in sport is much more important to small countries—the effect there is twice the size it is in the baseline countries.

Finally, older people tend to be more attached to their nations. Immigrants are a little less attached. There are no significant differences between old and young, or between the well-educated and the poorly educated.

DISCUSSION

Many influential hypotheses concerning the impact of globalization on national feeling find no support in these data—data which cover a large portion of the developed world.

TABLE 6 Pride in the nation's achievements leads to emotional attachment to the nation
Metric regression coefficients and related statistics for 24 nations.^a

	<i>Baseline slope</i>	<i>Slope, if different from baseline</i>		
		<i>English-speaking</i>	<i>Formerly communist</i>	<i>Small nations</i>
National pride:				
Pride in science	.06	.15 twice baseline		
Pride in arts	.10	.04 half baseline		
Pride in sports	.08		-.03 no effect	.19 twice baseline
Pride in economy	.06			
(Significance)	-	$F=17.0, 2 \text{ d.f.}$ $p<.001$	$F=76.1, 1 \text{ d.f.}$ $p<.001$	$F=75.0, 1 \text{ d.f.}$ $p<.001$
Small nation (0/1)	ns			
Age (years)	.25			
Male (0/1)	ns			
Education (years)	ns			
Immigrant (0/1)	-6			
Born in this city (0/1)	ns			
Lived abroad (0/1)	-1			
(Cases)	(22,366)			

Data: International Social Survey 'National Identity' module, 1995-96.

ns= not statistically significant, $p<.01$, two-tailed.

^a See the Technical Appendix for details.

1 Globalization

Contrary to all arguments about economic and institutional globalization eroding national feeling, we find that national pride continues strongly in all 24 of the countries in our study. Large majorities in each of the 24 countries derive feelings of national pride from their science and technology, their arts and literature, their sport, and their history.³¹ Nations are more diverse in the degree of pride they take in their economies, their armed forces, the way democracy works in their country, their redistribution/social security systems, their fair and equal treatment of all groups in society, and the country's political influence in the world. Importantly, in this diversity many values are high, and there is no sign that countries which are more integrated internationally take less pride

³¹ That there is so much pride in history may be surprising in some instances to an outsider, but it is to be remembered that military disasters can be defined as heroic defeats (Olberg 1995, Goode 1978), and that countries invest substantially in establishing public celebrations and in writing and re-writing schoolbooks to emphasize different facets of history (Waldstreicher 1995, Weekley 1999, Zadjia 2000).

in these areas. Moreover, feelings of attachment or closeness to the nation predominate in each of the 24 countries. All in all, the survey evidence is strongly counter to the view that economic or institutional globalization has eroded national feelings in the developed world, at least as of the mid-1990s.

Only one hypothesis about economic globalization—that as tariffs fall and a world market emerges people will evaluate their country's economic performance in terms of a single worldwide hierarchy—receives support.

2 The civilizing process

The civilizing-process hypothesis sees pride in the armed forces at its peak with the establishment of the modern nation-states in Europe, with nations subsequently learning (unevenly and with some backsliding) to keep their claws sheathed, and, in parallel, citizens re-focusing national feelings away from the military and onto areas such as the sciences, the arts, and literature. However, this hypothesis receives no support.

3 Postmaterialism

The postmaterialist hypothesis that below a certain economic threshold, countries focus on economic matters, and above that threshold they focus on the arts, science, and sport as expressions and enactments of national feeling receives no support in these 24 nations. Nor do feelings of attachment/closeness to one's country vary with development, seeming rather to reflect persistent cultural differences and, sometimes, particular histories.

4 Cultural diversity

The results strongly favour the persistent-diversity hypothesis. For example, among the developed nations, the English-speaking nations differ both from the Norse and the Germanic countries in their pride in science and technology and in their arts and literature, but not in their sport, while both Germanic and English-speaking countries take more pride in their economies than do the Scandinavian countries (in the mid-1990s). Non-English speaking nations gain more from their achievements in literature and the arts. Moreover, pride leads to warmer feelings about the nation more strongly in those countries than in anglophone nations.

It seems likely that not all the diversity we observe is persistent, though. Rather some of it seems to reflect particular historical circumstances that may change. For example the very dismal feelings of Swedes about their economy in this period presumably reflect severely disappointed expectations as well as a mediocre performance recently. The striking lack of pride in their redistribution system in the ex-Communist countries presumably reflects the struggle of establishing largely market-compatible systems in relatively poor countries. And the German military still languishes in the shadow of Nazi horror.

Perhaps the best summary is that cross-national diversity is clearly present in these data, but it is not clear what particular situational factors predominate, nor is it clear to what degree deep-rooted cultural differences influence national feelings. The fact that some differences are observable across language groups suggests that enduring influences play at least some role. That is a beginning, but it thus far tells us nothing about what underlying dimensions generate those differences among cultures.

The only dimension we've yet teased out is a structural rather than a cultural one, namely that 'size matters': citizens of small countries take a great deal more pride in sport, and a little more pride in science and art than do their peers in large countries, even net of differences in their social composition and language group. Moreover, the impact of pride in sport on national attachment is twice as large in small nations as in more populous ones, even net of differences in social composition and language group. It suggests that, at least in smaller nations, public support for sports may produce a genuine public benefit.

5 American exceptionalism

American exceptionalism is a particularly well-theorized instance of the cross-national diversity question, but the evidence here is mixed. For example, the English-speaking nations as a group take an unusually amount of pride in their science and technology, but Americans do so even more than denizens of other anglophone countries. Moreover, the intra-national processes generating pride in science are somewhat distinct in the USA where scientific pride is differentiated by education and gender to a larger degree than is true of other countries. But they are not fully distinct, for in the USA as in other countries, pride in science is shared equally by immigrants and the native born, by cosmopolitans who have lived abroad and their peers who have always dwelt in their native land, by deep-rooted folk who never leave the city of their birth and by rolling stones who gather no moss. On many of the other topics we examined, too, the summary would be neither simply pro nor con the American exceptionalism hypothesis. Rather, the best verdict would be 'American partial-exceptionalism'.

But continuing cultural diversity among nations is our most striking finding. It is to the substantive dimensions underlying the differentiation among language groups that future research might profitably turn.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

DATA

The ISSP participants for this module³² were Australia (International Social Science Survey/Australia (Kelley and Evans 1998*b*)); Austria (Institut für Soziologie, Graz

³² For the many countries that have contributed several surveys, we reference only the most recent.

University (Haller *et al.* 1998)); Britain (British Social Attitudes Survey, National Centre for Social Research (Jowell *et al.* 1998)); Bulgaria (Agency for Social Analysis (Dimova 1998)); Canada (Mass Communications Survey Center, Carleton University (Frizzell and Pyman 1998)); Czech Republic (Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (Mateju and Ilnér 1998)); Germany-East (ZUMA, Mannheim (Braun *et al.* 1998)); Germany—West (ZUMA, Mannheim (Mohler *et al.* 1998)); Hungary (TARKI (Kolosi *et al.* 1998)); Ireland (Social Science Research Center, University College Dublin (Ward *et al.* 1998)); Italy (EURISKO (Calvi *et al.* 1998)); Japan (NHK, Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (Onodera and Midooka 1998)), Latvia (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Akademijas Iankums (Tabuns and Zepa 1998)); Netherlands (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (Becker and Nas 1998)); New Zealand (Department of Marketing, Massey University (Gendall 1998)); Norway (NSD: Norwegian Social Science Data Services (Skjak *et al.* 1998)); Philippines (Social Weather Stations (Mangahas *et al.* 1998)); Poland (ISS: Institute for Social Studies (Cichomski and Morawski 1998)); Russia (Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (Khakulina and Zaslavskaya 1998)); Slovakia (Institute of Sociology, Slovak Academy of Sciences (Piscova 1998)); Slovenia (Public Opinion and Mass Communications Research Centre (Tos and Malnar 1998)); Spain (ASEP (Diez-Nicholas and del Castillo 1998)); Sweden (Department of Sociology, University of Umea (Svallfors and Edlund 1998)); USA (General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago (Davis and Smith 1998)). The Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of Köln painstakingly cleaned the data and reformatted demographic and background variables to a common format (Scheuch *et al.* 1998).

MEASUREMENT

The measurement of national pride, and of feelings of attachment to the nation, are described in the text. The questions were all asked in exactly the same wording, and exactly the same sequence, in all 24 nations.

The demographic and background variables are conventional. Age is in years. Education is in years of schooling. Male, immigrant, born in current city of residence, and experience living abroad are all 0/1 indicator variables.

METHODS

The model of Panel A in Tables 2 and 3 is:

Pride =

$$a + b_1 \text{Age} + b_2 \text{Male} + b_3 \text{Educ} + b_4 \text{Immig} + b_5 \text{BornTown} + b_6 \text{LiveAbrd} + \sum_j \text{Nation}_j + e \quad (1)$$

where Nation_j is a set of 23 dummy variables for the nations in the study; the USA is the omitted or reference category. Parameter estimates are by ordinary least squares regression. Significance tests in column 3 of the tables are from these dummy variables. The adjusted values in column 2 of the tables are obtained by evaluation of Equation 1 at the mean of the control variables for the USA.

The model in Panel B of the tables replaces $\sum_j \text{Nation}_j$ with variables measuring the size of the nation (distinguishing the larger nations from the smaller, the larger being

the USA, Britain, East and West Germany, Poland, Russia, Italy, the Philippines, Japan, and Spain), English-speaking nations (USA, Britain, Australia, Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand), and formerly Communist nations (East Germany, Russia, and the Eastern European nations):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Pride} = & \\ & a + b_1\text{Age} + b_2\text{Male} + b_3\text{Educ} + b_4\text{Immig} + b_5\text{BornTown} + b_6\text{LiveAbrd} + b_7\text{SizeOfNation} \\ & + b_8\text{EnglishSpeaking} + b_9\text{ExCommunist} + e \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

The analyses of Table 4 are from:

$$\text{Pride} = a + b_1\text{Age} + b_2\text{Male} + b_3\text{Educ} + b_4\text{Immig} + b_5\text{BornTown} + b_6\text{LiveAbrd} + e \quad (3)$$

restricted to, respectively, respondents from the USA only and to respondents from all other nations.

The analyses for Table 6 builds on:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CloseNation} = & \\ & a + b_1\text{Age} + b_2\text{Male} + b_3\text{Educ} + b_4\text{Immig} + b_5\text{BornTown} + b_6\text{LiveAbrd} + b_7\text{PrideScience} \\ & + b_8\text{PrideArts} + b_9\text{PrideSports} + b_{10}\text{PrideEconomy} + e \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

We then added all 12 interactions between the pride variables and the national level variables *SizeOfNation*, *EnglishSpeaking*, and *ExCommunist*. That model showed that only four interactions were statistically significant at $p < .001$, so in the interests of clarity and parsimony we dropped the others, leaving the final model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CloseNation} = & \\ & a + b_1\text{Age} + b_2\text{Male} + b_3\text{Educ} + b_4\text{Immig} + b_5\text{BornTown} + b_6\text{LiveAbrd} + b_7\text{PrideScience} \\ & + b_8\text{PrideArts} + b_9\text{PrideSports} + b_{10}\text{PrideEconomy} + b_{11}\text{SizeOfNation} + b_{12}\text{English} \\ & \text{Speaking} + b_{13}\text{ExCommunist} + b_{14}(\text{PrideScience})(\text{EnglishSpeaking}) + b_{15}(\text{PrideArts}) \\ & (\text{EnglishSpeaking}) + b_{16}(\text{PrideSports})(\text{ExCommunist}) + b_{17}(\text{PrideSports}) \\ & (\text{SizeOfNation}) + e \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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